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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

NSC Review Completed. **Routing Slip**

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SUSPENSE _____
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Remarks:

Executive Secretary

10/17/81

Date


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



6401-81

October 6, 1981

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TO : NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz
DOD - Mr. Jay Rixse
JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell
CIA -
ACDA - Mr. Robert Grey
OMB - Mr. William Schneider

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SUBJECT: SIG Meeting Summary of Conclusions

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the SIG meeting on CBW Arms Control held on October 5, 1981.


L. Paul Bremer, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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October 6, 1981

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Senior Interdepartmental Group No. 9

PARTICIPANTS: See Attached Sheet

DATE AND TIME: October 5, 1981, 10:30 a.m.

PLACE: Department of State, Room 7219

SUBJECT: Chemical-Biological Weapons Arms Control Policy

Summary of Conclusions

The SIG on Chemical-Biological Weapons Arms Control policy convened on October 5, Under Secretary Stoessel chairing.

On Biological Weapons, the SIG agreed to recommend to the NSC: continuation of our public information campaign, particularly at the UNGA, regarding Soviet and Soviet allies' activities; support for convening a meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with a view toward strengthening its verification and compliance provisions; and, absent progress, consideration by the NSC of putting the issue before the UN Security Council and/or withdrawing from the BWC.

On Chemical Weapons, the SIG agreed to recommend that the U.S. support discussions in the Committee on Disarmament on a complete CW prohibition with new and strengthened verification provisions, leading to negotiations if further detailed study within the U.S. Government should support such a step. The chairman stated that completion of the study should be possible before the CD convenes in February, 1982. Pending a complete and verifiable prohibition--which appears unachievable in view of anticipated Soviet opposition--the U.S. will continue its CW programs.

Action Requirements

1. The State Department will circulate by COB October 7 a draft policy paper based on the options favored by the SIG: the BW option, CW option 1(b) and CW option 2(c).

2. The IG was tasked to provide support of points identified as warranting more detailed study. These were: (1) on BW, analysis of measures to strengthen verification and compliance provisions of the BWC, and (2) on CW, formulation of Administration positions on (a) verification requirements, (b) declaration

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of production facilities, and (c) declaration of CW stocks.

3. The SIG undertook to submit the above recommendations to the NSC at an early date.

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ATTENDANCE

CBW SIG

October 5, 1981, 10:30 a.m.

State Department, Rm. 7219

State

Amb. Walter Stoessel, Chairman
Mr. Richard Burt - PM
Mr. David Gompert - EUR
Mr. Mark Schneider - S/P
Mr. Tain Tompkins, Notetaker

ACDA

Mr. Robert Grey
Mr. Arch Turrentine

CIA



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JCS

LTG Paul Gorman
COL Charles Bay

NSC

MGen Bob Schweitzer
Mr. Sven Kraemer

OMB

Mr. William Schneider

OSD

MGen R. T. Boverie
Mr. William Bode
Mr. Michael G. Macdonald